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Abstract
The research is intended to analyse the problem of informational asymmetry in macroeconomic level. The authors state that 
individual economic agents (firms) could lie about their economic situation in public surveys, so that their lying could be 
detected on macroeconomic level. To demonstrate the possibility of such hypothesis the method of simple regression was used. 
The regression was calculated in clustered data, where the discrepancy between expressed expectations of industrial firms and
their immediate acting through the new orders in manufacturing is taken as a criterion to detect the “lying” or “true” statistic 
periods. The research was made on the basis of French industry’s data and revealed that firms could lie in the periods here named 
as “Lying optimism”. The possibility to detect the “lying” moments on macroeconomic level could be used for the forecast of 
business cycle turning points, in financial market, as well.
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1. Introduction
In the paper, the authors explore the issues in economic lying detection. The concept of lying in economic 
perspective is not new and aversion to lying is addressed frequently, mainly in microeconomic theory frames, agent 
dilemma and information assymetry ((Rehm, Andre, 2005; Menichini, Simmons, 2006; Childs, 2012; Gneezy, 
Rockenbach, Serra-Garcia, 2013). In this paper the lying is described as the discrepancy between the “said” and the 
“done” – a term used by the authors. As stated in this research, the economic lying is a systematic phenomenon 
originated from the general principles of the competition in the market and business self-preservation and it might be 
revealed in some specific moments of particular business or personal life. That’s why the problems of lying 
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detection are generally analysed in microeconomic (even personal), criminal, psychological theoretic and empiric 
works (ex., Crawford, 2003; Fischbacher, Utikal, 2011; Gurdal, Ozdogan, 2013; Holm, 2010; Hurkens, Kartik, 
2008). They investigate factors of lying, moral issues also as the possibility to detect the lying. For example, 
Lundquist, Ellingsen, Gribbe,& Johannesson (2009) found that “individuals have an aversion towards lying about 
private information and that the aversion to lying increases with the size of the lie and the strength of the promise”.
On the other hand, the authors of the research raise hypothesis that the lying could be detected even on 
macroeconomic level, because microeconomic behavior of all business activities is interrelated via a business cycle. 
7KLVLGHDZDVSUHVHQWHGILUVWO\E\'DSNXV0DNVY\WLHQơLQ³7KHLGHQWLILFDWLRQRIPDFURHFRQRPLFO\LQJ´LQ
Lithuanian language). Other scientific works about the lying detection on macroeconomic level were not found by 
the authors of this research. Aiming to check hypothesis of macroeconomic lying, a method for a macroeconomic 
lying identification is proposed and applied on the basis of French industry statistical data. 
Except the signals that in some cases economic agents could lie, and this could be detected on macroeconomic 
level, the results of this research create the added value by the initiation of discussion about the questions: could we 
use the surveys data as reliable information source for macroeconomic forecasting? How could methodology for 
evaluation of Industrial confidence indicator be improved? How could the stopping of “industrial new orders”, other 
“hard” data collection change the quality of business surveys? 
2. Method
The principles of lying detection method are classical and based on the definition of a “lie”: to detect the lying 
facts, the “said” must be compared with the real act of a particular subject (“done”). In this research, verifying 
hypothesis of macroeconomic lying we must compare the economic statistics, which reflect the “said” and the 
“done” on macroeconomic level. 
The first group of statistical data may be got from surveys: the statistics is based on expressed opinion of 
economic subjects and so sometimes (authors’ assumption) the “said” could derive from real thinking. Because the 
data is depersonalised “opinions” that could not be used as a proof to accuse someone of lying,  in some moments, 
however, economic agents  may lie even intentionally (or do it unintentionally) trying to disclose the real situation. 
In this research the “said” information is represented by the statistical data from EUROSTAT- the changes in 
monthly data of “Industrial Confidence Indicator” (NACE Rev. 2) got from Business surveys (European and 
national indicators for short-term analysis). The “Industrial Confidence Indicator” is used for qualitative evaluation 
of industrial expectations (here they could be treated as “soft, said” information, which could be tendentious and 
here is under investigation).
The second group of statistics represents “hard” data and is based on official accounting of business or 
households activity, and therefore the accounting is not simple to falsify (otherwise this could lead to administrative 
punishment). In this research two groups of “hard” data from EUROSTAT was used: 1) monthly changes in 
“Industrial New Orders Level” (NACE Rev. 2) are used to cluster statistics for further analysis, and 2) monthly 
changes in Production Index is used for detection of possible behavior anomalies in different data clusters. 
The basic information leads us to the mechanism of evaluation of “macroeconomic lying” hypothesis. The steps 
of evaluation are presented below.
1) Firstly, we must to cluster data according to coincidence of “said” and “done”. “The Industrial new orders” 
(INOI) is the earliest information considering production process, which coincide with the moment of gathering 
Business survey information (“Industrial confidence indicator” - ICI). Discrepancies or coincidences between the 
change in ICI and INOI let us to group statistics in 4 data clusters: 
• Periods, when the change of ICI and INOI are both positive. We call this group as “Optimistic true” (OT); here 
business expresses positive expectations toward the future and in the same time they act also in a positive way - 
business increases new orders for future production and sales.
• Periods, when change of ICI and INOI are both negative. We call this group as “Pessimistic true” (PT); the 
pessimism here is expressed in expectancies and in real acting; 
• Periods, when the change of ICI is positive, but INOI is negative. We call this group of data as “Lying 
optimism” (LO) cluster or “Imitation of optimism”; in cluster moments are combined, when firms declare seeing 
positive trends in economic development and in the same time they reduce new orders, which in fact could lead to 
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future decrease in production. Such acting really expresses negative view toward the future despite expressed 
optimism in a survey and may be deemed as lying behaviour cases.
• Finally, periods, when the change of ICI is negative, but INOI is positive. We call this group of data as “Lying 
pessimism” (LP) cluster or “Imitation of pessimism”: the discrepancy between “said” and “done” lets us attribute 
this attitude to lying behaviour, as well,  as the “pessimism” is related  to expressed “negative” expectations in 
industrial confidence indicator’s change, while the volume of industrial orders is increasing.
It is proposed to use average data of 2 periods (t-1; t) for both indexes in order to limit the manifestation of 
UDQGRPIDFWRUVRQGHYLDWLRQVEHWZHHQ,&,DQG,12,WKHGDWDZLOOEHFRGHGDV¨,&,
2) Second step in detection of lying behaviour is performed in the 4 clustered data groups: we must evaluate 
relations between changes in Industrial confidence indicator (ICI) and changes in Production Index (PI) in the near 
future (t+n). By this procedure we verify how the “said” in (t, t-m) moments is related with the “done” in the (t+n) 
moments especially in clustered data groups: as production lags from expectations expression taking into account 
the production process, so we need to test, if  the primary signals of lying, got “now”,  are confirmed by real acting 
in the “future”. The calculation of simple regression is used to identify possibly lying behaviour: if direct relation 
between change in expectations and change in production intensity is found, the data probably reflects “true” 
behaviour. In reverse case, if the inverse relation was detected, the probability of lying behaviour could be declared. 
So, to declare our hypothesis as realistic about macroeconomic lying, 2 sub hypotheses must be confirmed: positive 
regression should manifest for “pessimistic true” and “optimistic true” data clusters, while negative regression 
should be detected for “lying pessimism” and “lying optimism” data clusters. 
In the next step of our investigation the 3 cases of relations will be tested: 
• the relation between averaged data (t-1; t) of 2 periods of ICI change and averaged data of 2 postponed periods 
RI3,WWFRGHGDV¨3,
• the relation between averaged data (t-1; t) of 2 periods of ICI change and averaged data of 3 postponed periods 
RI3,WWWFRGHGDV¨3,
• the relation between averaged data (t-1; t) of 2 periods of ICI change and averaged data of 4 postponed periods 
RI3,WWWWFRGHGDV¨3,
This triple testing is proposed to evaluate the deepness and steadiness of analyzed relations.
3. Results
Here presented research was performed using 2000.01- 2012.04 monthly French industrial sector data. The 
limitations for statistics are determined by EUROSTAT’s data collection ability. The restrictive data is "Industrial 
new orders level” statistics, as the collection of data on industrial new orders by Eurostat has been terminated by 
Commission Regulation (EU) 461/2012, 31 May, 2012. The French industrial data was used to contrast research 
ZLWK DQDO\VLV RI *HUPDQ VLWXDWLRQ DFFRPSOLVKHG LQ 'DSNXV 0DNVY\WLHQơ  DQG HYDOXDWH SRVVLEOH
particularities between countries. 
The data clustering (first step of Macroeconomic lying evaluation process) gave the result that 42 averaged 
periods of all time data array could be assigned to “Optimistic true” data cluster, 31 period - to “Pessimistic true”, 33 
periods - to “Lying optimism” and 40 periods - to “Lying pessimism”. 
In the next step of analysis we try to found the relations between the change in Industrial confidence indicator 
(ICI) and Production index (PI). The results are presented in Table 1.
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Table 1. Relations between the change of ICI and PI in the determined 4 data clusters
Relation between... Regression equation R-squared Remark 
Not clustered data
«¨,&,DQG¨3, y = 0.1812x – 0.2119 R² = 0.1153 hypothesis confirmed
«¨,&,DQG¨3, y = 0.1592x – 0.2117 R² = 0.1531 hypothesis confirmed
«¨,&,DQG¨3, y = 0.15x – 0.2158 R² = 0.1743 hypothesis confirmed
„Optimistic true OT“ data cluster
«¨,&,DQG¨3, y = 0.1114x + 0.0653 R² = 0.0227 hypothesis confirmed
«¨,&,DQG¨3, y = 0.0348x + 0.2147 R² = 0.0025 hypothesis confirmed
«¨,&,DQG¨3, y = -0.0036x + 0.1688 R² = 6E-05 very weak negative 
regression
„Pessimistic true PT“ data cluster
«¨,&,DQG¨3, y = 0.1641x – 0.515 R² = 0.089 hypothesis confirmed
«¨,&,DQG¨3, y = 0.131x – 0.6917 R² = 0.1352 hypothesis confirmed
«¨,&,DQG¨3, y = 0.1013x – 0.6088 R² = 0.0686 hypothesis confirmed
„Lying optimism LO“ data cluster
«¨,&,DQG¨3, y = -0.1324x + 0.2937 R² = 0.035 hypothesis confirmed
«¨,&,DQG¨3, y = -0.0825x + 0.1142 R² = 0.03 hypothesis confirmed
«¨,&,DQG¨3, y = -0.023x + 0.1208 R² = 0.002 hypothesis confirmed
„Lying pessimism LP“ data cluster
«¨,&,DQG¨3, y = 0.3349x + 0.0832 R² = 0.0625 hypothesis not 
confirmed
«¨,&,DQG¨3, y = 0.1771x – 0.0148 R² = 0.0408 hypothesis not 
confirmed
«¨,&,DQG¨3, y = 0.2643x – 0.0137 R² = 0.1162 hypothesis not 
confirmed
* y- ¨3,[- ¨,&,+HUHQXPEHUVEHVLGHWKHLQGH[HVVKRZWKHTXDQWLW\RISHULRGDYHUDJHG
The research was made to verify the hypothesis about possibility of lying detection in macroeconomic level. As it 
was indicated, the general criteria for lying identification is the change of regression coefficient sign from positive in 
“true” data clusters to negative in “lying” data clusters. 
We can see that even in not clustered data group the relation is not reliable in formal terms (R-squared is between 
0.11 and 0.17, so less than 0.25). This is a limitation of our research, determined by availability of data, but knowing 
that the “Industrial confidence indicator” is used for macroeconomic forecasting we accept those results and 
interpret it in actual state. 
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The “true” clusters’ data generally demonstrate the positive coefficient of regression and so, this corresponds 
ZLWK WUXH QRW O\LQJ EHKDYLRXU -XVW LQ RQH 27 «¨,&, DQG ¨3,-4 relations) case we get negative regression 
coefficient, but its value (-0.003) is near zero, also is largely less than in other relations and the R-squared is close to 
0. As a particularity, we can see that PT relations are more intensive and we interpret that economic agents are more 
honest in prospectively recessional moments of business cycle, when economic agents are really disappointed. 
The “lying” data clusters disclosed the relations, which partly are consistent with verifying hypothesis. The 
DQDO\VLVUHYHDOHGWKDWQHJDWLYHUHJUHVVLRQPDQLIHVWHGMXVWLQ/2GDWDFOXVWHULQDOO«¨,&,DQG¨3,-4 relations), 
but the reliability is low. 
In our view, the second “lying hypothesis” (in LP cluster) must be corrected or other methods of lying 
identification must be used, because the negative regression actually is not seen. Regarding the results, we may 
make a premise, that lower turn point of business cycle (then the “lying pessimism” presumably manifest) is 
characterized by bigger instability and the sources of economic recovery are more complex than in upper turn point. 
5HJDUGLQJWKHUHVHDUFKGRQHRQWKHEDVLVRI*HUPDQLQGXVWULDOGDWD'DSNXV0DNVY\WLHQơLQWKLVresearch 
we confirmed the same tendencies in clustered data groups: the negative regression was found in “lying optimism” 
data cluster in Germany, as well as in France, but the confidence level of calculations was higher in German case 
(R-squared was significant). The “Pesimistic True” cluster also demonstrates comparable behaviour in France as it 
does in Germany. 
In our view, this research is made with smaller data quantity (for German data analysis the period of 1995-2011 
was taken) and that could influence very low confidence level (R-squared is significantly less than 0,25). 
Despite the low reliability of result in this research, we assert that firms’ lying behaviour could be identified in 
macroeconomic level: this was confirmed by congruence of logically constructed hypothesis and regression analysis 
results’, by timely stability of relations founded, partly by founding the similar behaviour in different countries. 
4. Conclusions
According to the aim of this research we found some empirical evidences that the lying behaviour of economic 
subjects could manifest even in macroeconomic level. On the other hand, those evidences could be enhanced 
developing further the proposed lying detection method. 
The analysed issue and proposed method also leave the space for scientific discussion about the use of surveys 
data for economic forecasting: the question remains open - how could we improve forecasting methods, taking in 
account the possibility of intentional lying in surveys responses? 
Here just the fact of macroeconomic lying possibility was verified. The methodology’s development could lead 
to creation of real tool to apply it separately as a method to detect business cycle, financial market turning points; in 
this research this tendency was overlooked just on hypothetical level. 
In the research the Industrial confidence indicator was used for hypothesis’ testing. If this indicator caused such 
debatable results, then it is necessary to improve this indicator in order to reveal possible lying factors. 
Now in a globalized world “liberal forces” try to influence statistical departments to collect less “hard” statistical 
data from firms in order to release them from “exaggerated bureaucracy” and so deliberate “productive forces”. The 
index of “New Orders in Manufacturing” was used in this research as a measure to detect “lying” data clusters, and 
the collection of such data was terminated by EUROSTAT. This fact reveals a question about the limits of statistical 
data collection and their replacement just by surveys data: how would the quality of surveys information change if 
the “soft” data was not verified by “hard” data? 
Summarising, if in opposing researches the hypothesis of informational lying is not finally confirmed, this 
investigational result could be used as some kind of validation for the qualitative (survey based) research methods. 
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